ABSTRACT:
This article assesses recent normative theorizing on militant democracy -the idea that democracies in order to protect themselves might under some circumstances have to restrict the rights of those set on undermining or outright destroying democracy. Particular attention is paid to new justifications of militant democracy which seek to avoid the danger of militant democracy itself damaging democracy, as well as the question of who the agent deciding on implementing militant democracy ought to be. Three new challenges for thinking about militant democracy are identified: certain forms of religious belief and practice; new varieties of authoritarianism which include elections and some limited freedoms; and the issue whether international and supranational institutions can play a role in protecting democracies.
KEYWORDS: rights restrictions, free speech, free association, party bans, Islamism, competitive authoritarianism 3 Should democracies take measures against political actors committed to the abolition of democracy through non-violent means? 2 Yet more recently there has been renewed interest in militant democracy among scholars in the English-speaking world. Political scientists have done important empirical work on the role that militant democracy can play in the protection and, especially, consolidation of democratic regimes, while constitutional law specialists have made many advances in comprehending different forms of militant democracy in different national contexts (Capoccia 2013; Müller 2012; Thiel 2009 ). Somewhat more surprising, perhaps, have been sophisticated attempts to think through the distinctive normative problems raised by militant democracy. I say "surprising," because militant democracy, I would argue, is categorically different from a set of challenges which for obvious reasons have absorbed much attention of political philosophers and The concept of "militant democracy" answers this question in the affirmative. A militant democracy does not wait until its enemies have gained majorities at the polls -it seeks to nip fundamental opposition to democracy in the bud. This idea was often seen as particularly European (or, even more parochially: German), since the failure of the Weimar Republic cast its long shadow over new European democracies in the second half of the twentieth century. It was also considered bound up with an "age of ideologies" (Bracher 1984) in which the enemies of democracy often spoke the language of democratic values, while de facto destroying or at least suspending democratic institutions (think of all the wonderful democratic things guaranteed in Stalin's 1937 constitution, or the promises of political equality which the Nazi Volksgemeinschaft held -though for "ethnic comrades" only, to be sure [Müller 2011]) . 4 political scientists in the last fifteen years or so: terror and the question of what kind of responses liberal democratic states should fashion against those committed to spreading fear through spectacular acts of violence (Sajó 2006) . As said at the outset, militant democracy is precisely not about such states' reactions to violence (or other kinds of conduct, which one way or another, are already covered by ordinary criminal law). One might even say that it is not about acts at all, but about beliefs and values (and the forms of their articulation). The typical object of militant democracy during the Cold War was an association which declared its intention to replace democracy with something supposedly better, but did not perpetrate violent acts; typical response were banning political parties and associations, and restricting free speech. Yet one cannot simply continue using Cold War, or, for that matter, interwar conceptions of militant democracy; there's a real danger that discussion in political theory might become "stagnant" and "fixed on the orthodox terms of 'militant democracy'" (Rosenblum 2008, p. 453) .
The reason for militant democracy's renaissance today, I would venture, are an upsurge of racism in a number of countries as well as widespread disquiet about religion (which nearly always can be reduced to anxieties about Islam); there are also new forms of authoritarian politics (think of Russia and Hungary) which do not officially break with democracy and which continue to hold more or less free and fair elections. In short, there are novel concerns about anti-democratic (or perhaps just anti-liberal) doctrines and hence what John Rawls called "the practical task of containing them -like war and disease -so that they do not overturn political justice" (Rawls 1996, p. 64) . One of the important questions, then, is whether the "orthodox" instruments of militant democracy, such as party bans and restrictions on free speech, can simply be redeployed in new circumstances -or whether militant democracy in fact needs new means. In a second step, I shall shift to the main normative justifications that are currently on offer. I want to point out that virtually all such justifications of militant democracy remain highly contested, while, at the same time, there is some consensus as to what relevant measures and actors to implement militant democracy are likely to be. In a third step, I shall discuss the distinction between what I call hard and soft measures which a militant democracy might employ against its supposed enemies, and determine what is at stake normatively with soft approaches (which, prima facie, pose less of a danger than measures categorically to deny citizens certain possibilities for participating in politics). Finally, in a fourth step, I shall focus on three new challenges for militant democracy; to these coherent normative approaches have only slowly begun to emerge: restrictions on religiously inspired actors; the problem of new forms of authoritarianism whose leaders do not in any way officially disavow the values of liberal democracy and yet de facto destroy liberal democratic institutions; and, finally, the question whether international organizations could ever assume the tasks of defending democracy (which I shall discuss mainly with reference to the European Union, by all accounts the institution in which supranational political, legal, and economic integration has advanced the most).
Militant Democracy: Problems and Paradoxes
Theorists writing about militant democracy often mention "paradoxes." On closer inspection, one can identify at least two, radically different paradoxes that might be in play: one is the supposed fundamental paradox that democracy can abolish itself, which is to say: democracy can be undermined and eventually extinguished with democratic means. However, even cursory reflection would confirm that this paradox , if it is one at all, is not peculiar to democracy: a monarch or a dictator could initiate a transition to democracy, for instance. After all, at least according to a somewhat cartoonish image of authoritarianism, power in authoritarian regimes is entirely concentrated in one pair of hands (or at least a small number of hands). So, when considered at a very abstract level, monarchies or dictatorships might in fact be more vulnerable to sudden self-abolition of the regime than democracies, since there are unlikely to be anything like checks and balances or other kinds of constraints.
Another, more precise version of this alleged paradox is that democracy -or, as it sometimes put, liberalism (Brettschneider 2012 ) -furnishes its enemies with the means to fight 7 it, unlike other regimes that can be ruthless with people they perceive as opponents (without contradicting the values they espouse in justifying their existence). Here, advocates of democracy never fail to quote Hitler's propaganda minister, Joseph Goebbels, who famously gloated that "it will always remain one of the best jokes of democracy that it provided its mortal enemies itself with the means through which it was annihilated." Yet the fact remains that there are very few historical examples of democracies which were destroyed from within through entirely legal means (never mind whether these means could be considered legitimate). The Weimar Republic is, of course, considered exhibit A for a scenario of democratic selfdestruction. But many invocations of the demise of the Republic in 1933 tend to leave out what are hardly just details. In particular, it is often forgotten that no functioning democratic legislature authorized the effective end of self-government. The Reichstag that voted for the "Enabling Law" of March 1933 could not be considered as such. Hence to argue, as for instance an American constitutional scholar does in an article on "Abusive Constitutionalism," that Hitler came to power through "constitutional means", because he "convinced both the President and the Reichstag…to give him the dictatorial powers he needed to create a totalitarian state", is historically questionable, to say the least (Landau 2012, p. 198). 3 To be sure, this is an empirical point only. From the point of view of normative political theory, two further arguments might be added: one is that the supposed vulnerability of democracy is also a distinct strength: democracies allow citizens to voice their discontent; rather than seeing social and even political dissatisfaction immediately turning into the destruction of democracy, one might see fundamental rights as -among other things -providing a safety valve.
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Grievances are not pent up, as they might be in an authoritarian system, which is also fated to receive scant information from and about society (other than what the secret police might gather), unless one thinks that less than free and fair elections in authoritarian regimes can help gather information (including the strength of potential opposition to the regime) (Brancati 2014 (Lefort 1988, p. 39) .
Still, the debate needs a shared stage --though, according to Lefort, not a "guarantor" (a point with which proponents of militant democracy would precisely disagree: militant democracy, after all, seeks to provide such a guarantee). What is said and what is done on the common stage should remain unpredictable, making democracy what Lefort -in this respect very similar to Adam Przeworksi's approach --has described as a form of institutionalized uncertainty (Przeworski 1991) . The crucial point is that this uncertainty is an outcome of what Rosenblum has called "regulated rivalry" among parties (Rosenblum 2008) and does not necessarily 9 constitute anything like a permanent disadvantage for democracy as such. On the contrary, openness and conflict contained by legitimate institutions might enable democracy to deal with crises and challenges far better than other regime types (Runciman 2013 ).
What about the other paradox? Here the thought is that the very attempt to defend democracy will damage democracy: governments will fight their enemies until they become like their enemies; they might think that they have held on to democracy, but actually destroyed it in the process of securing it (which was essentially Kelsen's core objection to anything resembling militant democracy). This seems more like a genuine paradox ("to keep democracy you have to destroy it;" you simultaneously believe in democratic principles and consciously engage in conduct likely to undermine those principles). Sceptics about the very idea of militant democracy might be well advised to start their critique right here, at the most fundamental level, just as Kelsen did: they might say that challenges to democracy would in almost all cases resolve themselves through the regular political process; if they don't, then no special political and legal measures will be able to stop a slide into authoritarianism. Hence any attempts to defend the supposed substance of democracy are likely to be counterproductive; they are likely to push some off Lefort's shared "stage" and hence damage the legitimacy of the political process permanently (assuming that criminal law, as opposed to militant democracy could deal with those who engage in violence and have no right to be on the stage in the first place).
Alternatively, sceptics about militant democracy might say that countries which can have militant democracy probably don't need it; whereas those that need it, cannot have it. 
Why?
Because any country where the most powerful actors can agree on what genuine threats to democracy are (irrespective of whether these threats emanate from the right or the left; or from religion or secular ideologies), probably has such a strong democratic consensus that challenges to democracy will fail by themselves. Conversely, in highly polarized and unstable polities, characterized by deep moral disagreement, militant democracy might make some sense -but the very facts of polarization and disagreement probably prevent the creation of a militant democracy. Everyone might be too concerned about the abuse of party bans for partisan purposes, for instance, to agree to have such measures available.
Basic Justifications of Militant Democracy: Power and Pedagogy
None of what has been said so far demonstrates that democratic self-defense is necessarily either superfluous or bound to lead to democratic self-destruction. In any case, militant democracy is not a standardized model, but more an abstract normative concept which can be rendered more precise with many different moral, political, and legal-institutional conceptions, often very much dependent on national context (Rosenblum 2008) . Serious reflection on militant democracy, I submit, should focus on at least three questions: first, what might serve as an underlying justification for militant democracy? Second, which measures, such as party bans and individual rights restrictions, might be authorized by a particular justification of militant democracy, and what should be the criteria for deciding to employ them? And, lastly, which actor or institution should authorize and implement such measures? In this section, I shall engage mainly with the first of these questions.
Since Karl Loewenstein's original proposal to institute militant democracy in order to "fight fire with fire" , probably the most commonsensical and widely accepted justification of militant democracy is that self-protection is a legitimate concern for new and fragile democratic regimes, or also for particularly divided societies -what Samuel Issacharoff has called "fractured democracies" (Issacharoff 2007) . It is a more or less obvious fact that in a new democracy there are likely to be many citizens who up until recently seemed willing actively to support or at least quietly put up with non-democratic political arrangements.
Hence the possibility of what sometimes is rather unthinkingly called "backsliding" to authoritarianism is not fanciful, and militant democracy might be crucial in deterring the enemies of democracy. Some scholars have therefore firmly located a normatively defensible account of militant democracy in a "transition paradigm."
6 As Ruti Teitel has argued, militant constitutional democracy ought to be understood as belonging to transitional constitutionalism, associated with periods of political transformation that often demand closer judicial vigilance in the presence of fledging and often fragile democratic institutions; it may not be appropriate for mature liberal democracies (Teitel 2007, p. 49) 12
The question, though, is whether militant democracy for fragile democracies necessarily has to take the form of allowing for the restriction of fundamental rights (to association, assembly, and free speech in particular). After all, I would argue, the logic works also the other way around: in new democracies, power-holders might be more tempted to abuse the provisions of militant democracy to harm legitimate opponents or even push them out of the political game altogether.
It therefore seems prima facie imperative never to leave militant democratic measures at the discretion of political actors in young democracies; instead, militant democracy should be built as much as possible into the constitution. Selective rigidity for the constitution -which is to say: making some parts hard or even impossible to amend -seems a plausible strategy, as does empowering a constitutional court to rule on potentially unconstitutional constitutional amendments (Landau 2012). Of course, in fragile democracies it is also more likely that the courts will be packed. And it is more likely that parts of the population might be mobilized to generate a claim that a constitution's unalterable provisions should still be trumped by a kind of Never mind the question whether one can sell oneself into slavery -a democracy should never permit the disempowerment of parts of the demos, or so proponents of such a fundamental justification of militant democracy would hold.
The obvious riposte here is the following: it seems that in order to prevent disenfranchisement, we need to start disenfranchising -which indeed appears as an instantiation of what I analyzed further above as the second possible paradox of militant democracy.
However, this kind of normative gotcha-claim is a little too hasty. Banning a party, for instance, does not amount to politically excluding its members and voters once and for all, in a way that authoritarian regimes might seek to disenfranchise once and for all. In a democracy, successor parties may arise that take a somewhat more moderate stance, and voters might see them as a second-best option (see Bale 2007 for empirical examples). One can find such developments still distasteful, of course, and argue that, in such scenarios, everyone will know that, for instance, the supposedly more mainstream successor party is just as committed to racism as the original version; it's just that its politicians have become better at phrasing their goals in a legally acceptable way. However, this overlooks that parties do not simply represent voters and their concerns in the sense of mechanically reproducing what's already there in terms of interests and identities: parties shape and to some extent even constitute their own support. What Michael Saward has called "the representative claim" is not about the depiction of a pre-existing political reality; rather, it is a kind of hypothesis about the relevant characteristics of a potential political audience, which is to say: a possible constituency (Saward 2006) . Hence different, somewhat 14 more liberal-democratic claims to representation for those harboring undemocratic beliefs might yield a positive effect on a political culture. In short, there is reason here to have some "faith in politics" (Rosenblum 2008 ).
But perhaps the rights of those harboring such beliefs should sometimes be restricted more extensively? A common line of reasoning here is that those who use rights only eventually to restrict the rights of others are acting in bad faith and hence forfeit their claim to have rights in the first place. As John Rawls put it in A Theory of Justice, a "person's right to complain is limited to violations of principles he acknowledges himself. A complaint is a protest addressed to another in good faith" (Rawls 1971, p. 217) . However, using rights to advance a political cause is not necessarily the same as a "complaint" -and those opposed to democracy in a functioning democracy might complain about the system they live in for all kinds of reasons, but not about the violation of democratic principles. Moreover, as Alexander Kirshner has argued, participation in democratic processes cannot be equated with holding the belief that democratic processes are legitimate; as Kirshner puts it: "those who oppose democracy are not offered a choice about the kind of regime they would like to live in. As a result, citizens cannot assume that democratic participation signals acceptance, and antidemocrats cannot be accused of acting in a deceptive manner when they play the game of democracy" (Kirshner 2014, p. 42 There is a further justification for militant democracy which does not concern itself with particular facts on the ground, so to speak. Rather than worrying about the actual power of unreasonable citizens, the claim here is that any toleration of unreasonable speech and organized activity is bound to have a harmful effect on the rest of society. Civility and dispositions to see politics as a matter of contained conflict (contained, that is, within shared political, legal, and, not least, moral parameters) will be damaged, or perhaps be destroyed entirely (Niesen 2003 ).
Allowing such anti-democratic attitudes free rein will result in the denigration of particular citizens; moreover, it will send a signal that organizing to destroy the existing form of fair social cooperation will be condoned by the legal system. Whether groups threaten normative stability republicanism" is legitimate; that is to say: rights restrictions can only be motivated by a politically "negative" past experience such as fascism, and might be most plausibly applied to former ruling parties in an undemocratic regime (Niesen 2012) . By contrast, a general antiextremism is illegitimate, as it curtails the possibilities for citizens to engage with new ideas and forms of conduct. If a democratic people is a "learning sovereign," as Günter Frankenberg has argued, then a militant democracy that does not find a clear justification in past rights abuses deprives the sovereign of learning opportunities (Frankenberg 2003) .
To advance what I consider a somewhat stalemated debate (which often, but not necessarily, leads to a Euro-American opposition), I want to suggest a number of distinctions.
First of all, one needs to separate three possible scenarios of rights restrictions: the first holds fast to an American-style doctrine that only imminent lawless action justifies rights restrictionsbut adds that the state can still forcefully counter the messages conveyed by anti-democratic actors (Brettschneider 2012) . As Corey Brettschneider has suggested, a state might "protect hateful viewpoints in its coercive capacity and criticize them in its expressive capacity" (Brettschneider 2012, p. 3). The state, Brettschneider rightly points out, always acts as "educator, speaker, and spender" and faces citizens as a kind of audience of its expressions -an audience with an interest in the polity as a whole being democratic and as seen to be committed to democratic principles. Hence, when educating, speaking, and spending, the state should engage in "democratic persuasion" to convince its citizens to be simply -in Rawls's language -"reasonable": they should accept or even promote the values of free and equal citizenship (Brettschneider 2012, p. 7) . In this way, the free speech doctrine of "viewpoint neutrality" can be preserved: no speech is disadvantaged; but the state does not have to subscribe to what
Brettschneider calls "neutralism" and instead promote democratic values.
The second approach would outlaw certain kinds of speech -quite possibly including advocacy of destroying democracy from within by non-violent means -but not strip "unreasonable citizens" of basic, politically relevant rights as such. This is a common European strategy; but it is not necessarily one supported by the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, which requires an actual danger of the overthrow of democracy to be plausible (in that sense, the Court is closer to Learned Hand's famous position in Dennis v.
United States that gravity of a political evil needs to be discounted by its improbability). The difficulty, then, is to see whether there really is an area of problematic political speech that is not already covered by criminal law punishing, for instance, incitement to hatred.
The third, most draconian approach would effectively disenfranchise citizens: they would be declared to have forfeited their political rights as such. This last scenario is not fanciful; in fact, it has many precedents in political and legal history. Democratic Athens had the institution of declaring a citizen atimos -without honor -and thereby bringing about a loss of basic rights.
There was also the institution of ostracism, which in the eyes of many sceptics of popular participation in politics -perhaps most famously John Adams -became a prime example of mob rule. However, ostracism did not involve a judgment of the character of the person to be ostracized; moreover, ostracism was rare, lawful, and limited, as opposed to the violent struggles among elites characteristic of pre-democratic Athens (Forsdyke 2005) .
After the Liberation in France, the state introduced the crime of indignité nationale for those who had collaborated with the Germans under the Occupation and which incurred the penalty of dégradation nationale: a citizen was declared "unworthy" and stripped of basic political rights (Simonin 2008 ), a measure which leading French politicians put back on the national agenda after the Charlie Hebdo massacres in January 2015. Now, the issue at least at the point of Liberation was certainly not power -but a kind of political pedagogy mixed with concerns about historical justice; the law that attributed "infamy" to a citizen had primarily an expressive function -and arguably the same would be true, if indignité nationale were reintroduced for the case of violent Islamist terrorists. Finally, the loss of rights remains at least a theoretical possibility in the liberal-democratic constitution still most commonly associated with 20 militant democracy today: the German Verfassung, whose Article 18 provides for a forfeiture of rights by those who "abuse" them to fight the "free-democratic basic order" of the state. There have been four applications to bring about such a "civic death" of individuals; none of them has been successful.
Such drastic rights restrictions (or loss of rights altogether) are not justified with concerns about power, or, in Quong's language, a concrete danger to overall normative stability of a polity. To pick up the distinction I introduced earlier: they are all mostly pedagogical; except that a complete and permanent loss of political rights would seem to suggest that a citizen has essentially been deemed "unteachable" and, if anything, his or her case is meant to teach an example to others. A potentially different justification -never invoked, as far as I can see --would be to say that "we good democrats" do not wish to be subject, however indirectly, to decisions in which irredeemably "bad political characters" have had a hand. Think of a perfectly democratic politician who might say they refuse to be elected to major office with the votes of a party that they deem hostile to basic democratic principles.
Again, such thoughts are not fanciful. While many democratic theorists regard disenfranchisement of citizens as anathema, de facto democracies do disenfranchise those below a certain age on the basis of the at least implicit claim that children and youngsters lack political judgment; and some democracies disenfranchise prisoners who serve time on the basis of particularly heinous crimes (and some states in the US disenfranchise on the basis of any record of felonies, of course). The obvious concern here is that even those with fully proven antidemocratic credentials may not have committed any actual crime. "Abuse of rights" is a dangerously open-ended category, and at least according to some political theorists, rights that do not allow for the possibility of dong wrong are no rights at all (Waldron 1993) . Moreover, it is one thing to reduce political options, when exercising certain rights; it's another to take away rights altogether. One is being deprived of an option to express preferences, once a particular party has been banned; but one can still vote for other parties, some of which perhaps still advance one's core interests as a citizen. But if rights central to political participation are taken away completely, by definition possibilities to advance interests are severely curtailed (Kirshner 2014 ).
If such civic deprivation is not to be a permanent state, one also has to ask: how might those stripped of basic rights ever regain them? Would they have to sit a citizenship test, perhaps designed specifically to detect whether traces of "unreasonableness" remain in the applicant's mind? Should specially trained bureaucrats have a conversation with repentant perpetrators of "unreasonableness" to see whether they really can be fully re-incorporated into the political community?
Even apart from such perils of abusing the charge of "abuse of rights," there is the fundamental challenge that even the proven enemies of democracy -unless they are stripped of citizenship altogether -remain part of the democratic polity. As Alexander Kirshner has argued, it is a mistake to identify even the most fanatical enemy of democracy necessarily as what
Kirshner calls an "ascetic antidemocrat" who has no other political claims or concerns than fighting the idea of self-government (Kirshner 2014) . These individuals retain legitimate interests in political participation and unless one wants to apply the logic that their participation somehow taints the political process as a whole, such interests will have to be accommodated. In this, as in a number of other respects, domestic anti-democrats, so to speak, are not like soldiers of a state with which one is at war, or foreign (or, for that matter, domestic) terrorists committed to advancing political causes through violence. Hence it is hard not to agree with Kirshner's claim that any plausible account of militant democracy should be "self-limiting," as opposed to aiming somehow at a purified people of fully committed democrats (though it is hard to see that anyone actually advocates the latter). But how can the goals of self-limitation and incorporation of anti-democrats be best realized?
Criteria and Measures: Hard and Soft
Can one distil plausible criteria for employing measures of militant democracy from the recent normative debates? A desideratum is that, in general, citizens -however unreasonable -should have the rights respected which a theory of justice would accord to them; moreover, they should not be treated like complete outsiders to the polity or as quasi-children whose judgment must be considered somehow impaired. Hence there are strong reasons to think that individuals should never be completely stripped of rights, and that -short of speech that can be sanctioned with the criminal law -they should be free to voice their political views, however normatively problematic they might be.
The matter, I would argue, is different for parties and other associations: it's one thing to advocate anti-democratic ideas; it's another actively to organize and gather political strength.
This basic intuition -collective, institutionalized action is more threatening than individual interventions in public discourse -is at the heart of the concentric containment model proposed The concentric model of democracy protection takes seriously the "power-justification" of militant democracy discussed earlier in this article (which also means that at some point it necessitates an empirical assessment of whether a party has come too close to power). At the same time, the model relaxes the need for a pedagogical role of the state; in a way, it actually turns the picture painted above upside down: allowing more speech is meant to teach the state about what is really brewing, so to speak, in society. Now, the notion of prioritizing freedom of speech over freedom of association is a plausible one. But there appears also to be something deeply patronizing about a position according to which one does not really listen to speech, but immediately takes speech to be a symptom of something else: nobody, or so the assumption seems to go, is truly opposed to seeing their fellow citizens as free and equal; surely the issue must really be fear of unemployment, anxieties about welfare, etc. -the sort of reasoning which is very prevalent in diagnoses of the causes of right-wing populism (inevitably associated today with "anxieties" and "resentments").
Moreover, from the point of view of any democratic theory, it seems hard to deny that banning a party that has grown strong is normatively more harmful than outlawing a fringe party. Again, the anti-democratic party, like certain kinds of speech, is treated like an instrument, a kind of political probe better to understand society, rather than as a way of citizens to express and advance interests.
An alternative to banning -but one that preserves some of the valuable intuitions of the concentric model of democracy protection -is the deployment of what I call "soft militant democracy." To be sure, it can only be called "soft" in contrast with the ultimate "hard" measure of banning a party or restricting rights to certain kinds of speech (not to mention the complete loss of political rights discussed above). Soft measures would leave a party in existence -but officially limit its possibilities for political participation, or de facto make life for the party difficult. Examples are Israel's approach of letting a party be, but not allow it to register for Knesset elections, because the party denies the Jewish and democratic character of the state (and/or incites racism); or India's party laws according to which certain kinds of speech appealing to religion and ethnicity are banned during election campaigns, but not in general (Issacharoff 2007; Tyulkina 2015) . Parties might also be allowed to compete in elections, but be denied party financing or specific means of campaigning, such as access to broadcasting.
However, as with the concentric model, there is ultimately something troubling about an approach that treats associations as political probes or perhaps safety valves for citizens --but 25 never as expressions of what autonomous citizens actually want their common life to look like.
Still, the "soft" approach is not without justification: the best hope is that, in the face of such (relatively) soft measures, parties will decide to become more moderate in order to stay, or fully participate, in the political game.
Measures of partial exclusion are relatively predictable and hence conform to ideals associated with the rule of law in at least some respects; the matter is different, if parties are effectively becoming the object of some kind of harassment. Their finances might be subject to especially high levels of scrutiny (a good accountant can always find something …), and life can be made difficult for them in other ways short of banning a party altogether. As German law recognizes, there is something deeply problematic about such harassment. The Constitutional Court has made it abundantly clear that even a party which the executive or the parliament seeks to have banned by the Court must not suffer any disadvantages in the political process, as long as a ban has not been issued.
Both the concentric model of democracy protection and strategies involving soft measures leave room for judgment, as far as the likelihood of political radicalization and moderation is concerned. By contrast, such judgment plays virtually no role in two approaches primarily associated with the post-war German experience: the official militant democracy doctrine of the German Constitutional Court, according to which a "fighting attitude" vis-a-vis the Basic Law is sufficient for banning (irrespective of the actual chances of the fight against liberal democracy to succeed); and the "negative republicanism" mentioned above, according to which the "essential affinity" between a party and the NSDAP provides sufficient ground for outlawing a party (Niesen 2003) . Both of these approaches can be understood, and even endorsed, as plausible responses to a uniquely problematic political past -but they can hardly be generalized as normative models of militant democracy. In the case of the German Constitutional Court's official doctrine, the result would be a constant hunt for associations, however insignificant, that voice anti-democratic views (but do not advocate violence or incite hatred). With "negative republicanism", there is a danger that even quite different political phenomena have to be made to look Nazi-like (if you only have a hammer, everything will look like a nail), or that certain threats to democracy go undetected, or at least are not sufficiently countered, because the historical analogy with National Socialism cannot be made plausible.
Who Should be the Guardian of Democracy?
There is wide-spread agreement that, if militant democracy is legitimate at all, it ought to be applied by impartial institutions, which primarily is to say: courts. History, and not only ancient history, shows that in countries where democratic institutions have been unconstitutionally suppressed, it has been done not seldom by those holding the executive power. Forms of government may need protection from dangers likely to arise from within the institutions to be protected (Tyulkina 2015, p. 73) While the insistence on courts as final arbiters of militant democracy is sensible in general, the devil (and the dangers from "within the institutions to be protected") might still be in the details.
For one thing, in prominent forms of militant democracy like Germany's, it is in the end still party politicians who decide on an application for a party ban --and, as is well known from the debate about emergency measures in the face of terror acts, the judiciary may often defer to the executive or a parliament, especially if a party can plausibly be associated with acts of violence.
Think of the ban of the Basque Batasuna party in 2003, which has never been shown to be implicated in violence itself, but which had not condemned a car bombing by ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna -Basque Country and Freedom), a violent separatist movement.
There is also the question from where courts can receive information to make an empirical assessment of the nature of a party -as well as the likelihood of a party actually abolishing democracy itself (or whether, as in the concentric model of democracy protection, a party is getting too close to power). Loewenstein had famously advocated for the creation of a political police, a suggestion also pushed by American authorities in West Germany after the Second World War (Meier 2014 ). Yet, by definition, the work of such a political police is not transparent. In the paradigmatic German context, the so-called Office for the Protection of the Constitution has been plagued by scandals; that particular bureaucracy has failed to detect actual terrorist groups (in recent years, the infamous, extremely violent terror organization National Socialist Underground in particular), while at the same time spending enormous resources on examining the beliefs of public figures, including sitting parliamentarians. Moreover, the infiltration of one party, the NPD, by the Verfassungsschutz led the Constitutional Court effectively to reject an application to ban the party in 2003 (Rensmann 2003) .
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There are two further and, I would say, less obvious aspects to the question of the main actor to implement militant democracy. One is normative, the other more empirical. The normative question is whether there ought to be anything like a duty -moral and/or legal --to ban a party, or whether prudential considerations might legitimately lead a government to refrain from an application to prohibit a party. The notion that the relevant actors ought to have some discretion in banning is sometimes referred to as the "opportunity principle" (Flümann 2015) . In one sense, such room for discretion seems sensible indeed: democratic politicians might rightly decide that the effort to ban a marginal party is simply not worth it, and, if anything could be counter-productive by making such a party much more prominent and potentially give its members the status of martyrs. But the outcome might not be so benign: for instance, if failure to ban a particular party harms opponents (for instance, because a small party siphons off votes from a mainstream party), a government might refrain from applying for a ban, despite a party engaging in significant anti-democratic activity. The second set of challenges has to do with new forms of authoritarianism that have emerged in the last two decades or so (Levitsky and Way 2010) . These authoritarian regimes have two distinctive characteristics: first, they do not disavow the language of democracy (even if they sometimes explicitly avow liberalism) and remain extremely eager to be recognized as proper democracies by international bodies such as the Council of Europe (think, for instance, of Azerbaijan's extensive efforts in Strasbourg). Second, they retain institutions and procedures commonly associated with democracy, in particular elections, and to some extent, political and personal liberties (even if they will also typically restrict the media, capture the judiciary, and repress civil society, thereby rendering elections neither free nor fair, even if there is no ballotstuffing on the day of the vote). In other words, there is a distinct challenge here of providing evidence that a regime is anti-democratic, given that, unlike in the case of racists or the typical Cold War phenomena of fascist and Communist parties, there is no official language directed against democracy). So far, the role of elections and, for that matter, constitutions in authoritarian regimes remains too little understood (Brancati 2014) . Indicators to measure "freedom" and "democracy" remain highly contentious and there is no clear methodology for 32 comparative judgements. Developing these remains a major desideratum in political science in general, but with a view to criteria for anything like an international militant democracy in particular. In particular, more has to be said about why a notion of "illiberal democracy" -as deployed by some of the new authoritarians, is normatively implausible. It is one thing to claim that there is spectrum of liberal-democratic institutions, with a hypothetical 'pure liberalism' at one end (the constitution decides all policy questions in a freedom-oriented way) and a hypothetical pure democracy (all policies, including what would ordinarily be found in constitutions, is subject to elections and other forms of direct citizen participation); it is another to say that somehow "elections only" -without free speech (as well as media freedom) and freedom of association -constitute a meaningful form of democracy. Even the most minimalist definitions of democracy require some notion of citizens being able to form political judgements;
Three New Challenges
hence free speech and freedom of association are not purely liberal "add-ons" -let alone luxuries -for democracy, but conceptually (and normatively) indispensable. Such arguments could be extended; but their implications for militant democracy -especially in light of what I have been calling the second paradox of militant democracy in this essay -also need to be better understood.
Which brings me to the final challenge: can there be (more) effective international or supranational forms of democracy protection? To be sure, this is not an entirely new concern:
there was a brief moment of enthusiasm for global "democracy guarantee clauses" after the Cold
War and even talk of enforceable basic human rights to "democratic governance" (Franck 1992; Halperin and Lomasney 1993 
